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The Supreme Court as Risk Manager:
An Analysis of Skinner*
Todd F. Volyn, James F. Mogan
& Lisa M. White**
Introduction
In 1983, the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) reported that,
from 1972 to 1983, "at least 21 significant train accidents involving
alcohol or drug use as a probable cause or contributing factor" caused
"25 fatalities, 61 non-fatal injuries and property damage estimated at...
$27 million in 1982 dollars." 1 Ultimately, concerns generated by such
data resulted in adoption of a regulation requiring railroads to "take all
practicable steps to assure that all covered employees.., provide blood
and urine samples for toxicological testing by FRA," following an event
such as a train accident involving a fatality.2
Following a challenge to the regulation instituted by the Railway
Executives Association and others, based on Fourth Amendment search
and seizure restrictions in the Federal Constitution, a federal district
court in California granted summary judgment for the government.3 A
majority of the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. 4 After granting

Skinner v. Ry. Labor Exec. Assn., 489 U.S. 602 (1989), hereafter Skinner.
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1 48 F.R. 30726 (1983).
2 49 C.F.R. § 219.203(a).
3 Unreported.
4

Ry. Labor Exec. Assn. v. Birnley, 839 F.2d 575 (1988).
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the government's petition for a writ of certiori, the U.S. Supreme Court
reversed again. 5 While Justice Stevens concurred in part with the
majority opinion written by Justice Kennedy and concurred in the
7
judgment, 6 Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented.
The Court identified the issue to be addressed as determining
"whether the Government's need to monitor... justifies the privacy
intrusions." 8 In holding that the intrusions are warranted, the majority
held that, while collecting blood and urine samples constitute searches
and are thus subject to constitutional scrutiny, the risks posed by
pervasive alcohol and drug abuse relieved the government of the normal
requirement of obtaining a warrant before conducting a search. Indeed,
the Court found that not even the normal constitutional minimum of
particularized suspicion of the one to be searched was necessary. 9 It
seems fair to characterize the Court's approach as that of risk manager.
Risk managers routinely impose "acceptable" costs to reduce
"unacceptable" risks. How much testing should be demanded of a
pharmaceutical before it is deemed safe and effective? How much
money will be diverted away from other worthy research efforts if X
amount of dollars is demanded? How much money will it cost to
implement a safety measure? How many lives would such a measure
save?
Dollars, limbs, and lives are all tanigible. Even if the number of
dollars or digits affected by implementing various regulations is an
educated guess, the decision maker can readily visualize the tradeoffs.
The image of unemployed workers left in the wake of bankrupt
companies is an image all too real. The same can be said of maimed,
poisoned, or dead citizens. When these are the possible outcomes, risk
managers can readily imagine the consequences of their decisions. What
of rules that do not readily translate into tradeoffs of tangibles? What
kind of image is conjured up by the prospect of, e.g., a 2% reduction in
5 Skinnersupra.
6 Id. at 634.
7 Id. at 635.

8 Id. at 621.
9 Id. at 602.
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privacy? How does one visualize, quantify or evaluate such factors?
Most commentators have viewed Skinner as a portent of a grand
erosion of privacy rights in general. It has been widely criticized for
leading constitutional jurisprudence down a path in which governmental
policies aimed at the pressing needs of the moment trump the enduring
10
principles of inviolability of the person.
Here, however, we would like to explore the role of the Court as
risk manager. In the next two sections, we briefly review the evolution
of the law of privacy and the "special needs" balancing test as applied in
other contexts. Then, we explore the impact of the technology behind
substance testing on the resolution of this case. Ultimately, it seems, as
11
has been earlier observed in this journal, that:
Risk management controversies should not be contests over
who can produce the most "experts" with the strongest
credentials - ones where non-technical interests are often
excluded ...
The object should not be to eliminate
controversy but to force everyone to grapple with the tough
policy choices that may be concealed in a mass of often
irrelevant technical details.
The Changing Face of Privacy
While the Supreme Court and commentators have alluded to privacy
rights for years, 1 2 it was not until 1965 that the constitutional

parameters of that right were comprehensively outlined. 13 The Court
10 See Daniel J. Larkosh, Shrinking Scope of Individual Privacy: Drug Cases
Make Bad Law, 24 SUFFOLK U. L.REv. 1009 (1990), Philip Davidoff & Christopher
Martine, The Drug War in the Workplace: Employee Drug Testing Under Collective
Bargaining,5 ST. JOHN's J. LEGAL COMMENTARY 1 (1989); Jeane Flaig, Preserving
Employee Rights During the War on Drugs,21 PAc. LJ. 995 (July 1990).
11 Julie A. Roqud, Regulating Air Toxics in Rhode Island: Policy vs. Technical
Decisions,2 RISK 123, 139 (1991).
12 See, e.g., Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) "[The makers of our Constitution] conferred, as against the government,
the right to be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men."
13 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.'479 (1965). (Law subjecting contraceptive
purchasers to legal sanctions held to violate the "right to privacy.")
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found that "penumbras" of privacy could be inferred from the context of
various constitutional amendments. From these penumbras, or zones, of
privacy, a broader right to privacy could be extrapolated. These were
zones into which the government could not enter without a compelling
interesL
The Court would later hold that these zones were so strong, that
even otherwise constitutionally valid antiobscenity statutes could not
stand if enforcement would be sought within the privacy of the home.
Thus, in Stanley v. Georgia, the Court struck down a statute that
14
criminalized possession of obscene materials.
The Fourth Amendment was central to the zone of privacy
formulation. 15 Under it, the Court has held that privacy interests are
defined by society's reasonable expectations of what those interests
17
are. 16 Moreover, what is ultimately protected is "people not places."
While the individual's subjective expectation of privacy is protected, as
with other subjective judgments, a given expectation can only be
18
evaluated in terms of others' views of its reasonableness.
The rough edges of privacy interests are most strongly defined in
search and seizure cases. The Fourth Amendment provisions requiring
warrants and reasonableness of searches is most strenuously tested
when government actors set out to determine what is concealed in those
zones of privacy that society deems protected.19 The rule here is that
such an infringement can lawfully occur only when the government
actor possesses a warrant based on probable cause. What have become
14 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
15 Griswold,supra.

16 Katz v. U. S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967). (Electronic monitoring of conversations
over a public telephone constituted an illegal search without a warrant. The Court
found that society affords a reasonable expectation of privacy in such circumstances.)
17 Id. at 351.

18 The difficulty in making subjective determinations is that there is rarely any
evidence that directly records the subjective state of the individual at the time of an
incident in question. Thus, most questions of subjective state are answered indirectly.
The fact finder is asked to infer the likely subjective state of an actor from all of the
available objective evidence.
19 U.S. v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
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widely recognized as the exceptions to this rule have found their

rationale in one of two places. When the Court has made such an
exception it has found that either what is searched or seized is not within
an area reasonably expected to be private or it has found that the search

was reasonable in light of all the circumstances.
Thus, the Court has found that diminished privacy expectations
justify warrantless searches of automobiles.2 Warrantless searches of
territory within the control of a criminal suspect are valid in the context
of a lawful arrest. 2 1 For example, limited extemporaneous searches
22
based on fear of the use of unlawful weapons are reasonable.
Nonetheless, requiring the government actor conducting the search to
demonstrate some measure of particularized suspicion of the person
searched has been consistently required in Fourth Amendment
3
decisions. 2
From earlier cases, one would expect resolution of a case such as
Skinner to be straight forward. One need only ask if there is a legitimate
expectation of privacy in one's body fluids and whether tests are to be
conducted pursuant to a warrant. At least a compelling government
interest and particularized suspicion of the person tested should be
proffered. Failing to find such guarantees in contested regulations
would warrant declaring them unconstitutional. And they would have

been, but for expansion of a "special needs" test.
Special Needs and Safety
In 1976 the Court announced that "a showing of individualized
suspicion is not a constitutional floor, below which a search must be
presumed unreasonable." 2 4 It noted that where affected privacy
interests were not great and an important governmental interest required
20 Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974) (Society affords a lessened expectation
of privacy in an automobile).
21 U.S. v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
22 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
23 But see, U.S. v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) (Police may seize an
individual who fits a "drug courier profile").
24 U.S. v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
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it, warrantless searches might be legitimate even in the absence of
particularized suspicion. 25 Until Skinner such circumstances were
largely limited to institutional settings. Thus, state hospitals and
schools, where governmental policies address a narrow scope of
recurring security concerns, required special attention. 2 6 Oddly, the
Court noted that in such circumstances "imposing unwieldly warrant
procedures... upon supervisors, who would otherwise have no reason
to be familiar with such provisions, is simply unreasonable." 2 7
Instances in which such "special needs, beyond the normal need for
law enforcement" 2 8 have been found have given birth to an
independent type of constitutional analysis. Where these "special needs"
exist a balancing test has been implemented. This test poses the
government's interest in effecting its policy against the individual's
interest in privacy. If the government can show that its interests are
transcendent, the warrant requirement and the probable cause
requirement will be cast aside. 29 Herein lies the heart of the Court's
risk management approach: A loss in privacy is to be weighed against
the objectives of a proposed governmental policy.
In Skinner, the Court considered the government's safety
objectives in such a context and balanced them against reductions in
privacy. The prevention of cataclysmic accidents was found to be an
25 Id. at 560.
26 This special needs analysis had been used before in other cases but was largely
restricted to institutional situations where a small number of administrators had to
deal with large, recurring security problems. Once such instance is in prison
administration. Skinner expanded this rationale beyond predictability. See, e.g.,
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (search of student property by school
officials); O'Conner v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (state hospital employees
subject to work area searches).
27 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 625 (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771
(1966)). This is an "odd" justification because it asserts that principle must yield to
administrative burden. Constitutional rights are rarely adjudicated in this manner.
28 TL.O., 469 U.S. at 351.
29 See, e.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. VonRaab, 489 U.S. 656,
(1989) ("Special needs" used to justify testing those with access to classified
information).
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acceptable justification for the intrusion imposed by extracting a small
amount of blood in a "procedure involving virtually no risk, trauma, or
pain, 30 - not to mention even less intrusive and invasive breath and
urine tests "collected in a medical environment." 3 1 The Court also
weighed the diminished expectation of privacy one has as an employee
in a heavily regulated industry and the ignorance of railroad supervisors
32
concerning warrant procedures.
While the Court labeled the government interest "compelling, ' 33 its
calculus appeared to give no special weight to privacy interests. 34 On
the one hand, safety objectives can be visualized in terms of miles of
wrecked trains, flames, mangled bodies, spilled chemicals, and property
damage. On the other hand, intangible privacy interests are difficult to
visualize. Urinating in a bottle, breathing into a tube, or, at worst, the
prick of a surgically sharp needle are most easily imagined. 35 This
30 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 625 (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771
(1966)).
31 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 626.

32 Id. at 628 and 623.
33 I.
34 Labeling the government interest "compelling" confuses the majority's rationale.
Under ordinary constitutional adjudication of fundamental rights such a finding is
essential to determining that government intrusions are tolerated. The court abandons
that method, however, when it states that special needs "may justify departures from
the usual warrant and probable cause requirements." Id. at 620 (quoting Griffin v.
Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987)). The entire opinion lines up the pros of testing
(benefits) against the cons of cost (effect on privacy). It is submitted that a mere
weighing of interests results; the ordinary emphasis given to protection of individual

rights is not found here.
35 Neither the majority nor the dissent seemed to be able to get beyond this point.
The majority noted that blood tests, breath tests, and urine tests were physically

unintrusive. At least one full paragraph is dedicated to proving this for each type of
test. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 625.
Justice Marshall, in dissenting, argued that "Constitutional requirements like
probable cause are not fair-weather friends, present when advantageous, conveniently

absent when 'special needs' make them seem not." Id. at 641. He also indicated a
belief that the physical presence of another person (supervisor) while one was
3 RISK - Issues in Health & Safety 243 [Summer 1992]

tends to skew the analysis in favor of what can be readily perceived.
Even those who argue most fervently against invasions of privacy
almost instinctively use safety to justify what they would otherwise
view as reorehensible. 36 In fact, three fourths of a surveyed population
favored mandatory drug testing for those involved in safety sensitive
37
jobs.
The Psychology of Technology
The technology behind drug and alcohol testing has had a profound
impact on the Court's balancing test and may have an equally profound
impact on society's view of the issue as a whole. The Skinner majority
was certainly comforted by the capabilities of such engineering. They
noted, e.g., that the serum and urine tests are commonplace medical
procedures 3 8 that are highly accurate. 3 9 The majority took
extraordinary pains to ensure that the accuracy of such tests was well
documented and understood. They noted several times that testing
procedures include "[analysis] by a method that is reliable within known
tolerances. ' 40 and that blood tests "unquestionably can identify very
compelled to urinate violate those requirements. Id. at 646. However, even he did
not seem to give adequate attention to to the intangible importance of privacy.
36 See, e.g., Larkosh, supra note 10. Larkosh painstakingly argues for the
impropriety of such tests arriving at the extreme position that drugs should be
legalized to protect privacy rights. Nevertheless, he concludes that "where an
individual's drug use poses a direct risk of physical harm to others because of the
sensitivity of their position in relation to public safety, drug impairment testing
could proceed without individualized suspicion."
37 Daily Labor Report, July 12, 1990, at A-8.
38 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 625, (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,
771 (1966)).
39 See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 610 n.3:
[While drug screens may be conducted by immunoassays or other
techniques, "[p]ositive drug findings are confirmed by gas
chromatography/mass spectrometry." ... These tests, if properly
conducted, identify the presence of alcohol or drugs in the biological
samples with great accuracy.
But see, John M. Gleason & Darold T. Barnum, Predictive Probabilitiesin
Employee Drug Testing, 2 RISK 3 (1991).
40 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 612. The Court quoted 49 C.F.R. § 219.307(b) and
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recent drug use.'

41

Technology must first be found to be "accurate" if its use in privacy
intrusions can be justified at all. There is a certain sense of calm in
knowing that only the truly guilty are likely to suffer loss of rights. Of
course, the guarantee that only malefactors are punished for actual bad
deeds could justify skirting any constitutional requirement. If arguably
unconstitutional acts are undertaken and the right result is obtained, no
one is the worse, the argument goes.
Efficacious technology is but one prerequisite to becoming
comfortable with the special needs test. The Court has also noted that
the special needs rationale will apply only where "the privacy interests
implicated by the search are minimal.' '4 2 This is another hurdle that
present technology seems to satisfy. The Skinner majority found that
where blood tests are used they occur "in a hospital environment
according to accepted medical practices.' '4 3 They also found that the
test is minimally intrusive, is commonplace, and "involves no risk,
trauma, or pain." 44 Moreover, breath tests, they noted, are "even less
intrusive.' '45 While the Skinner majority was not entirely comfortable
with the notion of urine collection, they ultimately concluded that since
samples "are also collected in a medical environment", there is no major
46
intrusion on privacy interests.
The dissenters in Skinner also sought to fight for the hearts and
minds of its audience with the tools of technology. First, they noted that
accepted the proposition without debate.
41 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 630. This is a point that is in great dispute. It is difficult
indeed to determine present impairment with some illegal drugs depending upon
whether urine or blood is taken. The majority alluded to this but then generalized that
present impairment can indeed be so found. See BLACK, TESTING FOR ABUSED
DRUGS: A PRIMER FOR ExEcuTAVs ONEMPLOYHE TESTING AND THE LAw (1988).

42 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624.
43 Id. at 625.
44 id.

45 lid
46 id.
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procedures such as "compelling a person to submit to the piercing of his
skin" 4 7 is indeed an intrusive procedure as are the other specimen
collection techniques. More importantly, however, they set forth their

view of the state of diagnostic medicine. They noted that the body fluid
collected for these tests can be used to unveil a panoply of personal
information that would otherwise be kept confidential. 48
While both the majority and the dissent made several references to
the intrinsic qualities that are affected by such intrusions, 4 9 the focus
was overwhelmingly on physical, extrinsic acts and results. 5 0 A
technology-based argument allows this issue to be framed as a problem
of a physical, tangible dimension. Is a momentary prick of a needle an
intrusion of constitutional dimension? Is the potential for the revelation
of private medical information found in one's urine of constitutional
import? Reasonable people can probably differ over the answers to such

questions. However, the real questions have not been addressed when

such questions take center stage.
Focusing on a physical act and the physiological impact of that act
obscures the fundamental interests in privacy. A hypothetical drug test

will help clarify this point. Suppose that a completely unintrusive drug
47 Id. at 644, 645.
48 "Technological advances have made it possible to uncover, through analysis of
chemical compounds in these fluids, not only drug or alcohol use, but also medical
disorders such as epilepsy, diabetes, and clinical depression." Id. at 647. Given the
significant investment in time, effort and money to get such diverse types of
information, this characterization of the process could be viewed as another parade of
horribles. Nonetheless, it is not completely unfounded. See, e.g., McNulty, Bush
Urges Spot Drug Tests, Chicago Tribune, April 9, 1989, at 1. (Description of an
instance in which applicants to Washington, D.C. Police Department were
surreptitiously tested for pregnancy while undergoing drug screening.)
49 The majority referred to the "personal or private" nature of urination and then
attacked the issue mechanically. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617. Justice Marshall, in his
dissent, stated that "even the deepest dignity and privacy interests become
vulnerable." Id. at 640.
50 See, e.g., Skinner, 489 U.S. at 650 (Marshall, J., dissenting): "I find nothing
minimal about the intrusion on individual liberty that occurs whenever the
Government forcibly draws and analyzes a persons' blood and urine."
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test is available today. Further, suppose it is 100% accurate and precise,
yielding no false positives or false negatives. For example, picture a
device that bounces a harmless pulse of light off the top of one's head
and analyzes the reflected energy. Through this hypothetical device, it is
possible to detect, e.g., whether or not someone had ingested cocaine
during the last twenty-four hours. Would such a device be useful?
Undoubtedly. Would it help deter illicit drug use if it was employed?
Arguably, yes again. Would the use of such technology pose a violation
of one's privacy interest? Yes, despite the fact that it is physically
unintrusive. Even despite the fact that its accuracy and reliability are
beyond question. Skinner aside, suspicionless use of the device
violates one's right to privacy if done under the aegis of government.
The Constitution protects "people, not place...what a person wishes
to preserve, even in an area accessible to the public..." 5 1 It enables
each citizen to remain free in their person. In essence, privacy is one's
internal sense of security. It is that sense that there is at least one place
free from interference of others: the inner self. Even though the
futuristic technology outlined above would not pierce any skin, would
not compel any urination, and would not result in any inaccurate
accusations, it would violate that inner sanctum. It would ask questions
that the government is not otherwise entitled to ask without the
voluntary participation of the individual. 52 It allows the government
into this protected area. Focusing on the physical acts of piercing,
urinating, and the results one obtains from them distracts one's attention
away from the intrinsic aspects of privacy.
Technology provides information. It may do so painfully or
painlessly, accurately or inaccurately. However, information is the end
result, irrespective of how it is obtained. It is the act of seeking
information that creates the intrusion on one's privacy. The physical
consequences of how it is sought are only important factors if the
government may dispute the inner sense of security in the first place.
Courts could engage in much more trenchant analysis by separating the
51 Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967).

52 Of course, this right, like most, can be waived. Where a person publishes
otherwise private facts, the government can use them.
3 RISK - Issues in Health &Safety 243 [Summer 1992]

technological component from the intrinsic component of privacy and
first analyzing the impact on the latter. Urinating is something everyone
does every day. Few less physically demanding or invasive methods
yield biological information about a person. Thus, at the heart of the
analysis is features of technology, and when one fixates on the physical,
extrinsic aspects of the invasion, the disruption to one's sense of
internal security tends to be lost in the technical details.
Some Consequences of the New Jurisprudence
The diminution of concerns for privacy interests has received a great
deal of commentary. 53 Generally, critics of the Court have been quick
to mark in a new era of Big Brother. The Skinner dissent has noted
that the Court has ushered in "mass governmental intrusions upon the
integrity of the human body that the majority allows to become
reality." 54 Regardless of whether or not this characterization comports
with reality, the majority position and its technology-based
jurisprudence have weaved a new series of threads into American law.
The stated objectives of the contested FRA regulations were to
prevent train accidents through deterrence and to enable the FRA to
accurately determine the cause of train accidents. 5 5 The Skinner Court
acknowledged that drug testing procedures would give results of offduty ingestion as well as on duty impairment. While the relationship
between such off-duty behavior and accident causation was not given
53 See, Lewis, Drug Testing: Can Privacy Interests be Protected Under the
"Special Needs" Doctrine,56 BROoKLYNL.REV. 1013 (1990).

54 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 655.
55 49 C.F.R. § 219.201(a)(1) (1987). See also, Skinner, at 652-3 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
Deterrence is not addressed here, but it was emphasized by the FRA and the
majority. Both found that the prospects of losing one's job as a result of drug

screening would translate into lower drug use. Yet, Justice Marshall sharply criticized
this view. He analogized to "believing that people who skip school or work to spend
a sunny day at the zoo will not taunt lions because their truancy... might be
discovered in the event they are mauled." Skinner, 489 U.S. at 655. Moreover, he
noted the majority's failure to cite any evidence that such a policy would have
deterrent effects. Id.
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much attention, the Court found that the results of such tests would at
'56 and would: 57
least provide "the basis for further investigative work
furnish invaluable clues for eliminating drug impairment as a
potential cause or contributing factor [in railroad
accidents]... and would help establish the significance of
equipment failure, inadequate training, or other potential
causes, and suggest a more thorough examination of these
alternatives.
The Court seems to have relied on the accuracy and reliability of the
testing methods to support its policy position without fully addressing
the effect that test results will have on the subsequent adjudication of
criminal matters. 5 8 Does private drug use a week ago suggest job
impairment today? While the argument has not fared well recently, many
attorneys find that evidence of past drug use creates a de facto
irrebuttable presumption of guilt. 59 Such technologically-based
evidence prejudices the accused's character in the minds of fact finders,
60
whether it is relevant or not.
56 Id. at 632.
57 Id. at 630.

58 See, Howard Markey, Jurisprudenceor Juriscience,25 WM. & MARY L.REV.
525 (1984). Judge Markey noted that "No Court, however, should base a decision
solely on science if doing so would exclude the transcendental ethical values of the
law. If a court accepts technological activity without evaluating fairness and justice
to the litigants, juriscience has displaced the jurisprudence."
59 See, e.g., Spence v. Farrier, 807 F.2d 753, 756 (8th Cir. 1986).
60 See, e.g., Nat'l Federation Fed. Employees v. Cheney, 884 F.2d. 603 (DC Cir.
1989), where the U.S. Army was conducting safety-related drug testing and
acknowledged that the results merely indicated past use. The Court held that although
the Army had not considered other testing alternatives such as neurobehavorial
testing, the drug test could be useful in affixing safety failure causation and was thus
not prohibited. While the Army may have other justifications for such testing that
are not found in the civilian sector, it is interesting to note the ready transference of
the accident-causation model as a justification. See also, Int'l Brotherhood
Electricians v. Skinner, 913 F.2d. 1454 (9th Cir. 1990) in which federal regulations
requiring private employers in the pipeline industry to perform random drug testing
were upheld. The testing was to be done on workers having maintenance, operating,
or emergency response functions in a field where fewer than 4% of the total number
3 RISK - Issues in Health &Safety 243 [Summer 1992]

While each case thus far has involved safety-privacy tradeoffs in
instances in which legislative facts were in dispuite, 6 1 the same
justification is apt to be applied in future cases disputing adjudicative
facts. Guilt or innocence will undoubtedly be determined by data
62
collected in the name of deterrence.
The technological attractions that have led policymakers to adopt
intrusive regulations will provide others with the justification to employ
them for criminal enforcement. Thus, the psychological impact of
technology could not only justify the imposition of intrusive regulations,
but it is likely to also have a major effect on criminal trials.
Conclusion
Under the U.S. Supreme Court's increasingly utilitarian approach to
privacy jurisprudence, the number of "special needs" is likely to
proliferate. As technology becomes more advanced it will be possible to
detect many other aspects of a person's life. The mere fact that the
government may do so will lead to a lower sense of intrinsic security.
As outlined above, this will have a snowballing effect on other aspects
of our jurisprudence. Legal presumptions of guilt or innocence,
evidentiary principles, and liability judgments all stand to be
fundamentally altered. The ultimate cause of this fundamental change to
the American legal system can be traced back, in large part, to the over
emphasis of risk-management considerations in privacy law.
Over 200 years ago, when the Constitution and its amendments
were inked, the cost of protecting intrinsic security was deemed not to
be offset by government needs for information. Excluding valuable
of accidents involved human error, none of which were fatal.
61 Questions of legislative fact go well beyond the scope of a particular trial. The
extent to which certain classes of employees are likely to use drugs is likely to be an
issue of legislative fact. In contrast, whether a particular employee has used drugs is a
question of adjudicative fact.
62 The Skinner majority minimized the likelihood and significance of the use of

test results as a prosecutorial tool. Justice Marshall, however, noted that 'This is an
unprecedented invitation, leaving open the possibility of criminal prosecutions based

on suspicionless searches of the human body." Skinner, 489 U.S. at 651.
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evidence and testimony that is improperly derived may exact a toll on
society's vindication of criminal behavior. Yet, these and similar costs
63
have been accepted for years.
The character of that analysis seems qualitatively different from what
has recently evolved into the "special needs" test. That analysis used a
calculus in which principle was weighed against short-term goals, and,
perhaps because the framers had lived under a system that had denied
many rights to them, principle won out. Until recently, that seemed to
be the position of the U.S. Supreme Court.
Now, however, the Court seems to have turned from intangible
principles to tangible results with dead and wounded bodies juxtaposed
against the accuracy of medical procedures and the physiological aspects
of sample collection. While science and technology can sometimes be
extraordinarily helpful in legal applications, 6 4 at best they provide data.
Data collection, however accurate the technique, does not generate legal
conclusions. Resolving issues of data relevance and weight calls for
making value judgments. This should not be obscured by technical
details - particularly where fundamental legal principles are at stake.
We do not argue that those who are in key positions at the time of a
calamity should or should not be drug tested.6 5 The basic issue seems
not whether the result in Skinner was proper but whether the Court
used the proper rationale for deciding the issues. The majority seems to
have eschewed traditional tools of constitutional analysis in adopting the
role of risk manager, and even the dissent seems to have unduly focused
on technical issues that do not seem to go to the heart of the matter.

63 E.g., allowing people to express themselves freely may cost dearly when grossly
disruptive ideas are advanced.

64 Consider,e.g., the ability of DNA fingerprinting to help resolve issues of fact.
65 Justice Marshall proposed the possibility of collecting a urine sample after a

train accident and storing it until a warrant is procured. This position is interesting
but was not seriously perused by either side. Perhaps a more fully developed
argument along these lines would have precipitated a discussion of the intrinsic

aspects of privacy rights. See, Skinner, 489 U.S. at 642-43.
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